Which offices does the president appoint

Get your appointees in place, have your own political personnel person, because the first clash you will have is with the White House personnel office.

What the White House sees as a presidential prerogative and opportunity to reward loyal supporters of the president, the cabinet secretary sees as a chance to mold a management team. The OPP has to strike the right balance for each president. The practice brings in people with new ideas and much energy to participate in governing their country. Many of these idealistic Americans, however, have recently had less than inspiring experiences with their nominations to high office.

Becoming a presidential appointee necessitates collecting much information for financial disclosure forms. Of appointees who served between and , 32 percent found gathering the information difficult or very difficult compared with 17 percent of appointees from to From surveys of past appointees, it is clear that the nomination and appointment process has room for improvement.

Many problems cited by respondents, however, are not hard to alleviate. One theme that came through clearly is that, once contacted by the OPP, many potential nominees felt that they had been abandoned without sufficient information about how the process would unfold.

Thus the dilemma of the modern White House personnel operation. Far larger and more professional than ever before, the number of appointees under its purview has grown so huge and the appointment process itself so procedurally thick and politically vexing that the OPP is often pushed to or beyond its limits in meeting the needs of the president, the appointees, and the country it is expected to serve.

Serving the Nation Until a few decades ago presidents lacked the personal staff to control the process by which appointees were selected. Related Books. Stalemate By Sarah A. Natural Resources Defense Council Skidmore v.

Humphrey's Executor v. Volpe More court cases. United States , U. Valeo , U. Synar , U. Olson , U. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. Abbott Laboratories v. Schechter Poultry Corp. Hampton Jr. Western Pacific Railroad Co. United States. The evolution of these practices, the President's response to them, and associated controversies are beyond the scope of this report. As just discussed, the Constitution authorizes the President to fill vacant PAS positions on a temporary basis through recess appointments.

Congress has provided more limited statutory authority for doing so, as well. Under the Vacancies Act, 34 when an executive agency position requiring confirmation becomes vacant, it may be filled temporarily in one of three ways:.

A temporary appointment made under the Vacancies Act is limited to days from the date of the vacancy, but the time restriction is suspended if a first or second nomination for the position is pending. In addition, during a presidential transition, the day restriction period does not begin until either 90 days after the President assumes office, or 90 days after the vacancy occurs, if the vacancy occurs within the day inauguration period.

The Vacancies Act does not apply to positions on multi-headed regulatory boards and commissions or to certain other specific positions that may be filled temporarily under other statutory provisions. In some cases, Congress has expressly provided in statute for the temporary filling of vacancies in a particular advice and consent position.

Generally, such provisions employ one or more of several methods: 1 a specified official is automatically designated as acting; 2 a specified official is automatically designated as acting, unless the President provides otherwise; 3 the President designates an official to serve in an acting capacity; or 4 the head of the agency in which the vacancy exists designates an acting official.

Congress has selectively enacted certain types of statutory provisions when establishing specific executive branch positions. These provisions pertain to qualifications, fixed terms of office, limitations on presidential removal of an officeholder, chair selection and removal, and holdover authority. In some cases, these types of provisions have influenced the dynamics of the Senate confirmation process discussed above. Each of these statutory provision types is discussed below. In many instances, Congress has mandated that appointees to particular leadership positions meet specified requirements.

Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA , require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Congress has, however, used qualification provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have statutory qualifications.

Statutory qualifications associated with a particular position might affect the selection and Senate consideration of nominees. The Administration's selection process might be limited to a smaller group of potential candidates for the position than would otherwise be the case.

On one hand, such a limitation might yield a nominee who has the profile envisioned when the office was established. On the other hand, the statutory requirement might prevent the nomination of an individual who did not meet one or more of the qualifications, but is otherwise well-suited for the post. Should the President elect to nominate an individual whose qualifications are perceived to fall short of the statutory requirements, the Senate must then determine whether to take note of that fact and whether to confirm the nominee nonetheless.

Most boards and commissions are required, by statute, to have a political balance among their members e. These negotiations involve both political and policy considerations, especially when the board or commission is involved in areas that, at the time, may be particularly sensitive.

This has sometimes resulted in a packaging process in which the President has submitted several nominations together for positions on a particular board or commission, and the Senate has then considered and confirmed them as a group. Some advice and consent positions have statutorily set terms of office, typically periods of four to seven years. Even though they have statutorily established terms of office, appointees to many fixed-term positions serve at the pleasure of the President.

This means that incumbents can be removed by the President at any time for any reason or no stated reason , as is the case with most presidential appointments. The length of the term might also influence the independence of the appointee from the President. On the other hand, an official whose term of office is longer than that of the President who appointed him or her may be less likely to feel a sense of allegiance or commitment to the President's successor.

In many instances where Congress has established a position with a fixed term, the statute provides that the President may remove an incumbent from office only for cause. For example, with regard to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission FERC , the United States Code provides that members "shall hold office for a term of 5 years and may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.

Arguably, this is the characteristic with the most impact on the level of independence of an agency's leadership from the President's direction. Many independent regulatory boards and commissions have authorizing statutes with such provisions. To the degree that a particular independent regulatory commission exercises quasi-judicial functions, it could be argued, based on a Supreme Court ruling, that its members would be protected from presidential removal even absent a specific provision to that effect.

White House vetting and selection and Senate consideration of nominations to fixed-term positions might entail a set of considerations different from those involving an appointment of indefinite duration. Where incumbents are protected from at-will presidential removal, they are unlikely to be involuntarily removed from office.

In addition, where the tenure of a nominee's appointment would outlast that of an incumbent President, those Senators not of the President's party might elect to prevent confirmation so as to preserve a vacancy that could be filled by an incoming President of their party.

The fixed terms for the members of many federal boards and commissions have set beginning and end dates, irrespective of whether the posts are filled or when appointments are made. The use of terms with fixed beginning and end dates is intended to minimize the occurrence of simultaneous board member departures and thereby increase leadership continuity. In the case of a position with a fixed term with set beginning and end dates, an individual is nominated to a particular seat and a particular term of office.

An individual may be nominated and confirmed for a seat for the remainder of an unexpired term in order to replace an appointee who has resigned or died. Alternatively, an individual might be nominated for an upcoming term with the expectation that the new term will be underway by the time of confirmation. Occasionally, where only a few months of the unexpired term remain, the President has submitted two nominations of the same person simultaneously—the first to complete the unexpired term and the second to complete the entire succeeding term of office.

On some commissions, the chair is subject to Senate confirmation and must be appointed from among the incumbent commissioners. If the President wishes to appoint someone who is not on the commission to be chair, two nominations are submitted simultaneously for the nominee—one for member and the other for chair. For many independent boards and commissions, the chair is appointed from among the group's members by the President alone, without a separate nomination. Often, the President will make his intentions clear when nominating a member whom he plans to designate as chair, once confirmed.

Chairs of executive branch boards and commissions typically serve in that role at the pleasure of the President. Thus, a President generally could remove an incumbent from his or her role as chair as a result of a policy or political disagreement. However, he would usually have to satisfy a higher "for cause" threshold for removing the same individual from his or her role as a member of the board or commission.

Some statutes that establish fixed terms for particular positions also permit an incumbent to remain in office past the end of her or his term without additional appointment or confirmation. In some cases, such a "holdover" provision allows an official to continue serving until he or she is replaced. Holdover provisions may affect the dynamics of the advice and consent process. If the President, on one hand, or key Senators, on the other, are satisfied with the performance of an incumbent member serving in a holdover capacity, nomination or confirmation of a successor might be less likely than it would be if the position were vacant.

Some boards and commissions have experienced extended periods during which one or more of their members are serving in a holdover capacity. Click here to follow election results! Appointment and removal power , in the context of administrative law , refers to the authority of an executive to appoint and remove officials in the various branches vested in its authority to do so.

In the context of the federal government, the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution vests the president with the authority to appoint officers of the United States, including federal judges, ambassadors, and Cabinet-level department heads.

Congress may authorize the president, the courts, or the heads of departments to appoint inferior officers, including federal attorneys, chaplains, and federal election supervisors, among other positions.

The president has the authority to remove his appointees from office, but the heads of independent federal agencies can only be removed for cause. The Appointments Clause provides the president with the authority to appoint officers of the United States, subject to confirmation by the U. These positions include ambassadors, heads of Cabinet-level departments, and federal judges.

Congress itself does not exercise appointment authority. However, the Appointments Clause calls for Congress to vest the authority to appoint inferior officers in the president, the courts, or heads of departments. The U. Supreme Court distinguished between officers of the United States and inferior officers in the case Morrison v.

Olson —clarifying that only Cabinet-level department heads, ambassadors, and federal judges qualify as officers. All other officers, such as federal attorneys, district court clerks, chaplains, and federal election supervisors, qualify as inferior officers.